Linked by Dennis Heuer on Wed 25th Aug 2010 22:23 UTC
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Member since:
2009-10-04
Many of the arguments in the article are based on an incorrect understanding of how SystemD works. Ultimately, an auditing system would not be capable of most of the things that SystemD does (unless it were made into a rampant layering violation
).
This is not completely true. SystemD doesn't have to actively observe and act upon any of the things that you mentioned. Sockets are created ahead of time, and SystemD leaves them alone (the kernel buffers the data). Hardware events are mainly observed by Udev (SystemD has very little hardware logic). And mount points are handled by AutoFS, also in the kernel.
Actually, SystemD can and does do this. It sets up AutoFS mounts. Any access will cause the process to block until the real file system is mounted. An auditing system would not be able to do this any better than SystemD can.
An auditing system would not be able to fix this problem. What is needed is a transactional file system. I am actually working on a transactional file system layer for the Linux kernel (about which I may write an article for OSNews someday
Edited 2010-08-26 00:27 UTC