Linked by Hadrien Grasland on Sat 25th Jun 2011 08:55 UTC, submitted by John
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Member since:
2010-03-08
I think you'd be surprised by how much desktop applications would be fine with no more access to your home or document folder than its own files and the files which you explicitly direct it to (through a system open file dialog, drag and drop or a CLI parameter). Most software is not dangerous by its very nature.
About six months ago, while I was using Windows as my primary OS, I've done the following exercise : opening the "Add and remove software" dialog of my Windows install, and finding out what security permissions each entry would need, given a redesign for a sandboxed OS. As it turns out, few entries actually needed disk access to more than their private folder and user-picked files at a conceptual level. These were...
-Adobe Flash Player, because it copies itself in web browsers' private folders (and as such alters your web browsing experience).
-AVG 2011, because current antivirus want to take over your entire system in the same way as malware.
-System updates.
-Driver software for my phone.
Would you agree that all of these are sufficiently dangerous to reasonably require a security warning and a double check that they come from a reliable source ?
Now imagine that the huge majority of applications which do not require a warning get installed very quickly, without hassle. Only when you install a truly dangerous piece of software do you get a warning. This way, you get a much improved user experience for everyday use and a much stronger user awareness and cooperation when some installation actually involves dangerous software. Add up a security warning dialog that is actually informative (unlike Windows UAC and its OSX equivalent), as permitted by the sandboxed model, and you get much stronger security than what we have now.
Edited 2011-06-26 05:55 UTC