Linked by Thom Holwerda on Fri 23rd Sep 2011 22:22 UTC, submitted by kragil
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Member since:
2010-06-19
Look, you seem to be under at least a couple of misapprehensions.
- The firmware will only boot code that has been signed using the right keys.
- The private signing keys have (theoretically) not been compromised.
- Unless the malware has those keys, there is simply no way for the malware to write anything to the boot sector that UEFI will boot.
- The malware also cannot write over UEFI, itself (theoretically).
There is merit to the security argument. Of course, to even get to the security argument, you have to grant that Windows is going to be compromised and that a substantial amount of malware is going to target the boot sector.
Also, you're contradicting yourself: either the tech is sufficient to create a walled garden (ie. it's secure), or it's not. If it's not secure, then people can get past the signing mechanisms in exactly the same way that you propose that malware could.
Edited 2011-09-25 09:07 UTC