Linked by Thom Holwerda on Tue 22nd May 2012 23:26 UTC
Internet & Networking "Just over two months ago, Chrome sponsored the Pwnium browser hacking competition. We had two fantastic submissions, and successfully blocked both exploits within 24 hours of their unveiling. Today, we'd like to offer an inside look into the exploit submitted by Pinkie Pie." A work of pure art, this. Also, this is not the same person as the other PinkiePie. Also also, you didn't think I'd let a story with a headline like this go by unnoticed, did you?
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RE[7]: Comment by Radio
by moondevil on Wed 23rd May 2012 13:11 UTC in reply to "RE[6]: Comment by Radio"
moondevil
Member since:
2005-07-08

Yes, because if you really cared to read everything, you will see that the outcome of such functions is used for buffer manipulation tricks.

This calculation then overflowed and made the result of this function zero, instead of a value at least equal to sizeof(uint32). Using this, Pinkie was able to write eight bytes of his choice past the end of his buffer. The buffer in this case is one of the GPU transfer buffers, which are mapped in both processes’ address spaces and used to transfer data between the Native Client and GPU processes. The Windows allocator places the buffers at relatively predictable locations; and the Native Client process can directly control their size as well as certain object allocation ordering. So, this afforded quite a bit of control over exactly where an overwrite would occur in the GPU process.

The next thing Pinkie needed was a target that met two criteria: it had to be positioned within range of his overwrite, and the first eight bytes needed to be something worth changing. For this, he used the GPU buckets, which are another IPC primitive exposed from the GPU process to the Native Client process. The buckets are implemented as a tree structure, with the first eight bytes containing pointers to other nodes in the tree. By overwriting the first eight bytes of a bucket, Pinkie was able to point it to a fake tree structure he created in one of his transfer buffers. Using that fake tree, Pinkie could read and write arbitrary addresses in the GPU process. Combined with some predictable addresses in Windows, this allowed him to build a ROP chain and execute arbitrary code inside the GPU process.


A safer language would have a runtime error when such situations get detected.

The logic error as you called is only required, because they need to calculate specific values for pointer math. Without pointer math no need for logic errors that turn into buffer exploits.

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