Linked by Thom Holwerda on Sat 9th Feb 2013 01:01 UTC
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Member since:
2011-01-28
"By clever usage of a codeless dynamic library, existing valid methods (such as CFEqual()) can be re-exported as different methods with the same method signature, such that MISValidateSignature will always return 0, allowing any unsigned binary to run."
By remapping security functions to other functions, they were able to override the security checks and consequently validate the un-jailed binaries. The brilliant part of the exploit is that it used apple's pre-existing signed code (referred to as the TEXT section) and didn't have to inject unauthorized code.
I'm impressed with this work, but at the same time I wonder why apple's code validator only validated the TEXT section of the binary? It seems like an unnecessarily insecure way to validate code. Am I missing something?