Linked by Thom Holwerda on Thu 28th Mar 2013 00:36 UTC, submitted by MOS6510
Internet & Networking "The New York Times this morning published a story about the Spamhaus DDoS attack and how CloudFlare helped mitigate it and keep the site online. The Times calls the attack the largest known DDoS attack ever on the Internet. We wrote about the attack last week. At the time, it was a large attack, sending 85Gbps of traffic. Since then, the attack got much worse. Here are some of the technical details of what we've seen."
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RE: Comment by marcp
by Alfman on Thu 28th Mar 2013 18:48 UTC in reply to "Comment by marcp"
Alfman
Member since:
2011-01-28

marcp,

"Please, don't spread the nonsense. It could possibly block some popular sites, but NOT "break" the internet."

Granted the headline was exaggerated and overgeneralized. But DDOS attacks, while boring and uninteresting, are often very effective. Much like an arm's race, the side with the most bandwidth will win a denial of service attack. The *only* reason this attack failed is because CloudFlare had enough bandwidth to withstand it. Most DOS victims fall very easily. The internet does not do anything to protect victims from DDOS today.




"How could you even brake the internet, when it was designed and created just so it would not break in such situations? de-centralisation and many routes."

The internet was designed to be resilient in the face of outright outages (deliberate or accidental), but it actually doesn't do very much to protect against IP based attacks. Maybe core DNS/BGP attacks would be more interesting to you?


I remember the news surrounding this following incident:

http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/networking/black-hole-routes-the-g...

This was an accident and not an attack, but for all intents and purposes a malicious attack against "the internet" could be achieved the same way. The BGP protocol, which tells all backbone routers where to route IP traffic, is inherently vulnerable to peers lying about IP connectivity. The administrators of such peers have the power to blackhole IPs at will (even those which aren't traversing their networks).

Presumably anyone guilty of doing this will be found out and eventually kicked out from the BGP peering, but it is a strong example of how the backbone internet is fundamentally built on *trust* in order to operate.

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