Linked by Eugenia Loli on Mon 9th Oct 2006 01:31 UTC
QNX Most people haven't heard of QNX Software, though they've likely come in contact with it. The real-time operating system is used where software failure can lead to catastrophic consequences, even death - from high-speed trains to air traffic control towers to highway toll systems. It's also used in more than 100 different types of cars on the road.
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QNX and Secunia
by NotParker on Mon 9th Oct 2006 06:22 UTC
NotParker
Member since:
2006-06-01

Claims about QNX and Microsoft and security remind me of the bull coming out of Firefox in the early days.

http://secunia.com/product/708/?task=advisories

9 Security advisories

One of those 9 is a "multiple":

http://secunia.com/advisories/18750/

"Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in QNX Neutrino RTOS, which can be exploited by malicious, local users to cause a DoS (Denial of Service) or gain escalated privileges.

1) The crttrap utility loads libraries insecurely, which can be exploited to load an arbitrary library containing malicious code by manipulating the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable.

Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code with root privileges (installed setuid "root" by default), but requires that the system is in text mode.

The vulnerability has been reported in version 6.2.1. Other versions may also be affected.

2) A format string error in the fontsleuth utility can be exploited to execute arbitrary code with root privileges (installed setuid "root" by default) by supplying a specially crafted string as the zeroth argument.

The vulnerability has been reported in version 6.3.0. Other versions may also be affected.

3) A boundary error in the libAp system library in the "_ApFindTranslationFile()" function when handling the ABLPATH environment variable can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow and execute arbitrary code with root privileges (used by various utilities installed setuid "root" by default).

A similar vulnerability is also present in the handling of the ABLANG environment variable.

The vulnerabilities have been reported in version 6.3.0. Other versions may also be affected.

4) A boundary error in the libph system library in the "setitem()" function when handling the PHOTON_PATH environment variable can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow and execute arbitrary code with root privileges (used by various utilities installed setuid "root" by default).

The vulnerabilities have been reported in version 6.3.0. Other versions may also be affected.

5) A race condition in the phfont utility (installed setuid "root" by default) when spawning phfontphf can be exploited to gain root privileges by manipulating the PHFONT and PHOTON2_PATH environment variables.

The vulnerability has been reported in version 6.2.1. Other versions may also be affected.

6) A boundary error in the su utility can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow by passing an overly long string as the first command line argument.

Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code with "root" privileges (installed setuid "root" by default).

The vulnerability has been reported in version 6.2.0. Other versions may also be affected.

7) An error can be exploited to cause the system to become unresponsive and hang by executing the following command:

echo -e "break *0xb032d59fnrncontncont" | gdb gdb

The vulnerability has been reported in version 6.3.0. The vulnerability does not affect version 6.0. Other versions may also be affected.

8) Insecure file permissions on the "/etc/rc.d/rc.local" file can be exploited to gain "root" privileges by adding arbitrary commands to the file.

The security issue has been reported in version 6.3.0. Version 6.0 is unaffected. Other versions may also be vulnerable.

9) A boundary error in the passwd utility can be exploited to cause a buffer overflow by passing an overly long string as the first command line argument.

Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code with "root" privileges (installed setuid "root" by default).

The vulnerability has been reported in version 6.2.0. Other versions may also be affected.

Solution:
Grant only trusted users access to affected systems.

Remove setuid bits from affected files. Set proper file permissions on the rc.local file, and allow only trusted users to run GDB.

Provided and/or discovered by:
1) Discovered by anonymous person and reported via iDEFENSE.
2) iDefense Labs
3) Filipe Balestra
4) Filipe Balestra
5) Knud Højgaard
6) Texonet
7) Discovered by anonymous person and reported via iDEFENSE.
8) Discovered by anonymous person and reported via iDEFENSE.
9) Texonet"

Edited 2006-10-09 06:26

Reply Score: 0

RE: QNX and Secunia
by t3RRa on Mon 9th Oct 2006 06:57 in reply to "QNX and Secunia"
t3RRa Member since:
2005-11-22

I am not an expert so I might be wrong but it seems most of the vulnerabilities are in unix compatibility stuff to me. hmmmm

Reply Parent Score: 1

RE: QNX and Secunia
by netpython on Mon 9th Oct 2006 15:41 in reply to "QNX and Secunia"
netpython Member since:
2005-07-06

I doubt a nuclear power-plant is directly connected if connected at all to the internet.

Those vulnerabilities aren't necesarily critical.Physical access is all that is needed.I'm quite sure the compound itself is heavily secured.

Reply Parent Score: 3

RE[2]: QNX and Secunia
by twenex on Tue 10th Oct 2006 00:12 in reply to "RE: QNX and Secunia"
twenex Member since:
2006-04-21

I doubt a nuclear power-plant is directly connected if connected at all to the internet.

Unless of course you tire of chess and wish to play Global Thermonuclear Meltdown ;-)

Reply Parent Score: 1