Linked by Thom Holwerda on Fri 11th Apr 2008 21:47 UTC
Windows User Account Control is easily one of the most hated features of Windows Vista, according to readers. The seemingly endless stream of UAC pop-ups, asking you to confirm this action or that action, just get in the way (and aren't particularly zippy, given the screen redraw). Others don't mind UAC, but there's no doubt it's a controversial 'feature' of the OS. At the RSA 2008 confab in San Francisco, Microsoft admitted that UAC was designed, in fact, to annoy. Microsoft's David Cross came out and said so: "The reason we put UAC into the platform was to annoy users. I'm serious," said Cross. Cross had more to say than just that: Microsoft is going to put more emphasis on whitelisting.
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RE[3]: Not so bad
by gustl on Sat 12th Apr 2008 20:56 UTC in reply to "RE[2]: Not so bad"
gustl
Member since:
2006-01-19

I did a thought experiment about how one would implement this on a per-user basis with a shared system view, but I couldn't think of anything great ...


Well, how about how the Linux desktops do it (Gnome as well as KDE). They are TWO different desktops and manage to have the same menu entries no matter if you log into a Gnome session or a KDE session.
Additionally there are system-wide setings for the Start menu (changeable by root) and user-specific changes to that system-wide settings.

Therefore, when root installs a new program, the entry is made to the system-wide settings, and as no modification entry is in the user-specific setting, the new program is displayed.
It is very easy and works well. The same is done with mime-type settings (which kind of file to be opened with which application).

On the reliability and perf monitor, I think it should require admin access because the program needs information about the specific Disk, CPU, and Network activity of everything on the system. Allowing untrusted users to see this information would be classiied as an Information Disclosure Vulnerability.


Quite the opposite is the reality. In the company I work for we calculate stresses and safety factors of engine parts with FiniteElement software. We need to know which machine is under which load when we start another number-crunching job. Needing admin rights just to get the information is ridiculus. I agree that priority enhancing ones process or priority changes to an other users process require admin rights, but not for getting information. Security by obscurity does not work, so why even try that approach. If the system becomes insecure when somebody finds out about it's load, network, memory and disk status, it's security is not worth much.

Reply Parent Bookmark Score: 6

RE[4]: Not so bad
by PlatformAgnostic on Mon 14th Apr 2008 06:44 in reply to "RE[3]: Not so bad"
PlatformAgnostic Member since:
2006-01-02

I agree that there are some reasonable scenarios where you'd want someone who's non-admin to be able to access performance statistics. Thus there exist two built-in groups on my Vista Business installation: "Performance Log Users" and "Performance Monitor Users." I haven't tested those myself, but based on their names and description strings I believe that these groups give you what you want: the ability to grant non-admin users the right to view perf data for the whole machine.

Reply Parent Bookmark Score: 2