The mounting irregularities of closed-source proprietary e-voting systems clearly show the need for a new approach to securing elections in the U.S. -- one centered on the use of open source technologies, writes Paul Venezia. 'It's time for us to make good on the promise of open elections and open our e-voting systems as well,' Venezia writes, outlining the technical blueprint for a cheap, secure, open source e-voting system. The call for open voting systems has grown louder as of late, with several projects, such as Pvote and the Open Voting Consortium, demonstrating how the voting booth could benefit from open source code. Such systems are already securing elections in Australia and Brazil.
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Member since:2006-01-16
I was just about to post nearly the same.
On the other hand, I think we should not miss out on new opportunities to use modern technology when it is available for improvements.
*Possible* improvements in the area of voting are clearly visible:
- No counting errors
- No unintentionally voided votes (system guarantees to cast the vote to the voter)
- Better usability possible to voters, faster voting process
- Much less human work needed
- Counting is done while voting, so no explicit counting stage necessary (think about U.S. election 2000, where it was ruled to _not_ re-count votes)
- Overall more cost-effictive
The question is: Is it possible to find an electronic voting system that can compete with pen&paper on the security level?
This question is IMHO not answered yet. Until it is answered, electronic voting systems should not be used. But also, one should wait for research instead of completely abandoning the idea.
About understandability: Think about a system where all votes are publicly printed in the voting room. After finishing a vote, one gets an anonymous id printed which is also found on the vote printout. Every voter can anonymously check if her vote was really cast. Vote helpers can check if the printout maches the system's database. This is just one simple idea to improve understandability compared to what is used today (I don't know why the current systems do best in avoiding understandability!).
Edited 2008-10-27 19:58 UTC
Member since:2005-07-07
Your "possible" improvements are unfortunately not possible at all. You'll simply never get the political will to do any of it.
On the technology, there will never be a way for anyone to look inside the machine and see what source code the running code was compiled from. I don't care if the source is opened - how do you verify that the code you downloaded last night is the code running on the voting machine today - or that some other device hasn't hijacked some function using a root-kit technique.
There are too many incentives and too many ways for people to cheat in an electronic voting system. Even worse, cheating is far more likely to occur than mistakes in every conceivable kind of voting. Given that, the only solution is to minimize cheating as best we can - even if we have to pay for that with mistakes.
The most effective way to minimize cheating is to simply use many many hands and eyes to count hand filled voting ballots. Contrast that with what it takes to steel an e-vote - just one or two individuals that program and/or setup these ridiculous machines.
Yeah, humans can make mistakes and humans can be bribed - but what a task it is to steal enough checked and balanced - hand counting humans to make a difference, vs. hiring one company/individual to make sure the computers are set up to count in your favor (this includes scan-trons).
There's a reason politicians are happy to spend many more times the amount of money for a system that is less reliable and much easier to tamper with (e-voting), rather than spending fewer dollars on simply designing easier to read paper ballots. And there's a reason obvious intimidation drops when e-voting machines are installed (that's for you NCAAP). Think about it. Why would so many incumbents support a more expensive, less reliable, easier to tamper with system. The answer is obvious.
Don't even get me started on the "legal" ways in which people are kept from voting.
http://www.stealbackyourvote.org/
Member since:2006-10-28
How about this - you are presented with a screen where you select the candidate you want. Then, the machine prints a small paper slip indicating your selection and you can look at the slip to make sure it's right and then put it in a ballot box. That way, counting is done electronically saving time, effort and money and there is a paper copy too in case a recount is needed.
Member since:2005-08-17
An open source voting system will not fix the problem with electronic voting.
The paper&pen system is only more secure because it requires a bit more effort to screw with.
A proper electronic voting system needs to allow citizens to trust their vote has been cast without having to trust the system used to cast the vote.
Any single person should be able to verify the whole election. This is likely possible to do with a system of public/private key cryptography. Which would actually be more secure than paper and pens because it would actually allow verification instead of just expecting the result is correct because it's a bit difficult to subvert it.
- Jesse McNelis
Member since:
2006-01-04
Even open source cannot fix a broken system.
Pen&Paper&Counting by humans works in every real democracy. It is tried and tested.
Electronic voting cannot be as secure and is not understandable.
Read these comments for more info:
http://lwn.net/Articles/303070/