Linked by snydeq on Mon 27th Oct 2008 17:24 UTC
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RE[3]: Secure E is a false statement.
by flanque on Tue 28th Oct 2008 08:17
in reply to "RE[2]: Secure E is a false statement."
RE[3]: Secure E is a false statement.
by bert64 on Tue 28th Oct 2008 10:51
in reply to "RE[2]: Secure E is a false statement."
What you want is a hybrid system..
One that presents you with a screen, you cast your vote on the screen, the computer keeps a tally (quick count) and prints you a paper vote and a receipt both containing cryptographic hashes but no other identifying information...
You place the paper vote in a ballot box and keep the receipt.
Votes can be counted manually to verify the electronic count is correct, and you can verify your receipt against a database of votes to ensure your vote was counted correctly, making any problems easier to detect and prove... And if there are significant discrepancies the election should be declared void and redone.




Member since:
2008-06-07
The problem is, in voting, you want voter anonymity, but still want to sum result correctly without duplicates. In bank transactions, it doesn't matter (in fact, bank wants the transaction to be recorded). That's why it's so complex to devise a good voting system.