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When a legit alert from a user's antivirus pops up, he doesn't really understand what is happening behind the scenes, so he just clicks the "Keep me safe" button. When a malicious pop up says the exact same thing he will do the exact same thing.
In your analogy, the user would most likely lend his TV set if the person that asked was his brother. If the user doesn't have at least some rudimentary training about computer security, there is no difference between the OS and an untrusted third party. It's the same entity, "the computer".
That's something I've been thinking about for some times. My answer is that system warnings have to look and behave in a way that no other app looks like, with imitation being forbidden in some way (or privileged in a way that the OS issues a "only install if you know what you're doing" window during installation).
As an example, let's suppose applications can't draw borderless windows and arbitrary-sized UI widgets, nor register double right clicks from the mouse. If the system uses some, this result can be achieved. This is akin to Windows 2000's use of Ctl+Alt+Del to prevent login window spoofing.
The user then only have to know that he can trust borderless windows, but must be careful about strange behaviors from the rest of the applications. That doesn't sound very complicated.
Edited 2010-06-25 14:13 UTC
But that violates principle #5 of your rant--limiting what the apps are allowed to do. In particular limiting the way the UI presents itself in regards to border, widgets, etc. strikes me as a very Apple-esque way of handling things that would certainly lead to developer discontent on any kind of open platform.
I have to say that all this talk about how to make installing un-vetted apps on Android as safe as installing vetted apps from the Apple App Store seems a bit pointless.
Why would Apple make their devices that complex and that potentially dangerous in order to add a feature (ie the ability to install Apps from an "open" source) that the vast majority of consumers don't care about? Apple's aim, it model, is to make complex devices as easy and safe to use as possible. Hence the App Store.
If the App store model proves unpopular Apple will not prosper and will probably change direction to be more Android like. If that approach proves popular and Apple prospers it will keep the model. Its pretty simple really. It will all work itself out in the long run.





Member since:
2009-02-11
One might argue that it requires the user to have some previous knowledge of malware. However, everybody has such knowledge, to some extent, in the form of common sense. If an unknown guy comes at home and ask if he can borrow your TV set, you'll probably say "no", because you're almost sure that he will never come back. What the system manufacturer has to do is to describe, in an understandable yet precise fashion, what the application wants to do. Precision is important : an application should not ask for "access to system files", but rather for "ability to change active wi-fi connection". This requires a fine-grained underlying security permission system.
A second thing the system manufacturer can do is to make the system analyze the permission being asked, and specifically warn the user about dangerous ones. As an example "Make a phone call with prior acknowledgement from the user" is relatively safe, while "Make a phone call without prior acknowledgement" or "Access all system files" are dangerous options, which the security system should warn the user about.
A security system built around those ideas can both help an expert who wants to know if the application is safe and a non-technical user who can check, at his knowledge level, if the software is asking for reasonable things.
I think this is a little more complex. A user with limited computer experience already places a lot of trust to his computer. If he can't understand what is going behind the scenes, and of course it's not reasonable to expect everyone to do so, he simply must trust his computer. This ranges from the simplest of things (the app will launch when I double click the icon) to the most complex (click here to restore the pc after it has broken). Since the user is trained to trust what the computer says, he will most likely do so when what the computer says is from an untrusted source. This is why the most successful attacks are the fake antiviruses.
When a legit alert from a user's antivirus pops up, he doesn't really understand what is happening behind the scenes, so he just clicks the "Keep me safe" button. When a malicious pop up says the exact same thing he will do the exact same thing.
In your analogy, the user would most likely lend his TV set if the person that asked was his brother. If the user doesn't have at least some rudimentary training about computer security, there is no difference between the OS and an untrusted third party. It's the same entity, "the computer".