Linked by Thom Holwerda on Fri 23rd Sep 2011 22:22 UTC, submitted by kragil
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Well that's not actually accurate. This isn't like BIOS, where you can run a desktop application in Windows to update your BIOS image. Windows, regardless of the runlevel, has no direct access to the UEFI image.
I'm not sure I see the connection.
You claimed that having secure boot *improves* the security of the OS, I (easily) disproved it by pointing the having secure drivers and boot sector is *completely* irrelevant once the OS itself is compromised - either by abusing an OS exploit or by (ab)using end-user stupidity.
In the long term secure boot can and will only be used to create a walled garden around the Windows eco-system; nothing more, nothing less.
- Gilboa





Member since:
2005-07-06
The benefit is that when Windows is inevitably compromised by a piece of malware, the malware can't write itself to the boot sector. "
OK, you do realize that once the OS is compromised, nothing stops the malware from deactivating the signature check mechanism and installing a key logger as a signed update or even throw in a modified kernel image while they are at it, right? Once a software gains "root/admin" *user* access to the system, this is end game for *any* security mechanism. (Even SELinux in strict mode can be circumvented given sufficiently determined attacker).
*Even* if Microsoft goes the extra mile (and they are most likely thinking about it) and disable installation of legacy applications and/or any applications that are not downloaded from MS Market - this still will be useless against OS vulnerabilities.
Walled garden, nothing more, nothing less.
- Gilboa
Edited 2011-09-24 20:26 UTC