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Look, you seem to be under at least a couple of misapprehensions.
- The firmware will only boot code that has been signed using the right keys.
- The private signing keys have (theoretically) not been compromised.
- Unless the malware has those keys, there is simply no way for the malware to write anything to the boot sector that UEFI will boot.
- The malware also cannot write over UEFI, itself (theoretically).
There is merit to the security argument. Of course, to even get to the security argument, you have to grant that Windows is going to be compromised and that a substantial amount of malware is going to target the boot sector.
Also, you're contradicting yourself: either the tech is sufficient to create a walled garden (ie. it's secure), or it's not. If it's not secure, then people can get past the signing mechanisms in exactly the same way that you propose that malware could.
Edited 2011-09-25 09:07 UTC
OK.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
How could I possibly make my point clearer?
- Gilboa





Member since:
2005-07-06
I'm not sure I see the connection.
You claimed that having secure boot *improves* the security of the OS, I (easily) disproved it by pointing the having secure drivers and boot sector is *completely* irrelevant once the OS itself is compromised - either by abusing an OS exploit or by (ab)using end-user stupidity.
In the long term secure boot can and will only be used to create a walled garden around the Windows eco-system; nothing more, nothing less.
- Gilboa