Linked by Thom Holwerda on Fri 23rd Sep 2011 22:22 UTC, submitted by kragil
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OK.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
You started out saying:
OK, you do realize that once the OS is compromised, nothing stops the malware from deactivating the signature check mechanism and installing a key logger as a signed update or even throw in a modified kernel image while they are at it, right?
Which is what I addressed. How could I possibly make my point clearer?
Perhaps by not changing your 'point' once it proves fallacious? I've been perfectly civil and patient with you throughout this exchange, so I feel justified when I say don't be a douchebag.




Member since:
2005-07-06
OK.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
How could I possibly make my point clearer?
- Gilboa