Linked by Thom Holwerda on Thu 12th Apr 2012 08:59 UTC
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RE[5]: This fixes nothing as e-mail itself needs a redesign
by Soulbender on Fri 13th Apr 2012 03:41
in reply to "RE[4]: This fixes nothing as e-mail itself needs a redesign"
It's even worse in that encrypted SMTP connections only happen between SMTP clients and servers that support it
Even worse, most servers default to accept any certificate from other servers regardless of expiration or validity. You will never know if someone does a MITM attack on your connections.
Server-to-server TLS is rather meaning less, really.
TLS, SASL, and other encryption/authentication methods are really only useful if you control *EVERY* SMTP client and server in the chain.
Not at all. TLS is essential for the confidentiality of your login credentials when you send and receive mail from the server.




Member since:
2005-07-11
It's even worse in that encrypted SMTP connections only happen between SMTP clients and servers that support it. Meaning, your e-mail client may use TLS to connect to your SMTP server, and your SMTP server may use TLS to connect to the next SMTP server in the chain .. but there's no guarantee that the next SMTP server will support TLS .. meaning the message goes through unencrypted.
TLS, SASL, and other encryption/authentication methods are really only useful if you control *EVERY* SMTP client and server in the chain. Which really only makes it useful for remote workers connecting in to the corporate mail system to send internal mail.
I like using the "postcard in an envelope" analogy when explaining e-mail to people. It really brings home the point that "anyone handling the message en-route can read it".