Linked by Elv13 on Sun 17th Jun 2012 10:35 UTC
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Member since:
2006-02-15
Way to misunderstand everything. I wonder which rock you've been living under.
You see, SecureBoot is controlled by a single entity with absolute power over it, there is no standardized way of creating keys when needed and no design committee to oversee its development. Since it is controlled by a single entity Microsoft can simply refuse to accept requests for keys on a whim. This is a clearly anti-competitive move designed to make using non-Windows operating systems much more difficult.
There is nothing wrong per se in trying to protect a system against boot sector viruses, but it should be made in such a way that there is a documented path for creating new keys via some form of a standards body consisting of multiple entities, and there should similarly be a clearly documented standardized way of disabling SecureBoot. Why a standards body then, you ask? Well, so that multiple entities can strutinize the proposals, to point out flaws and possible improvements that a single entity managing it would possibly miss, and to ensure cross-platform compatibility and end-user benefit.
No, it is not. You cannot e.g. expect IT personnel to install Openbios on every single device they may have to fix.
How would that protect against boot-sector viruses? If the write switch is off then it protects against no viruses, and if it is on the whole disk can only be used for reading stuff, ie. it would be inherently useless, ergo everyone would just keep it switched off -> no protection.