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No, they won't stop before Vista. As Miller mentioned, it is simply economic. When it is more difficult to do, it has a better price on the market attracting more people to do it. And those 40 days comparing 20 days, the extra 20 days, means barely little. That extra time is not given to Microsoft to provide the patch, because the attacker won't report the bug to Microsoft when he/she starts exploiting it.
On the other hand, the anti-exploit actually increase the maintenance cost of a system. The core dump information will be messed and debug a crash becomes harder, too. Then the debugger must become more complex as well as the debugger itself becomes more buggy. And once a debugger is mature, its algorithm and implementation will be shared with a hacker to work around the anti-exploit feature.
I think you have a misunderstanding here. Anti-exploit technologies usually aim to make the program crash more readily when it is exposed to malicious data. If the crash happens closer to the point of failure, it becomes easier to understand the bug and to debug problems. None of the mitigation techniques we use increase the obfuscation of the code.





Member since:
2006-01-02
It's pretty costly to develop an exploit against a Vista flaw. From Immunity Inc:
http://www.immunitysec.com/downloads/ApologyofOdays.pdf
Page 37: From Bug to Reliable Exploit on Win2k - ~12 days
Page 38: SP2/2k3 - ~20 days
Page 39: Vista - ~40 days
If it takes that amount of time for an expert researcher who is known in the 'grey' community for coming up with exploits for difficult areas, then chances are good that the average pre-packaged vulnerability will be quite expensive and a lot of potentially purchasers will become discouraged.
Also if the learning curve for exploit writing is steep enough maybe people will stop looking so hard (who's going to spend that much of their life looking for something when few people ever succeed?).