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Even if you are not paranoid, it doesn't mean they're not after you. ;-)
"xhost" is *defenetly* a bad idea!
The wrong idea with "xhost" is that it is "hostbound", like rhosts and rsh/rlogin/...
This should not be used!
Whats wrong with using *secure* tools?
"xauth" is more secure than "xhost" because it is "userbound" and "ssh -X root@localhost" is even more secure and even *more convinient*.
Please take a look at http://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Remote-X-Apps.html
The big risk with "xhost" is that the machine doesn't have to authenticate itself, in contrast to userbound authenication.
*Every* user on a accepted machine can abuse the X-Server: nobody, root, crackerjack, whatever.
But why bother with beeing logged in: Lets rename my machine, so it is allowd to mess with the X-Server.
Doesn't work? Let's send forged packages, that will do...
Even "xhost +localhost" is a bad idea, because it opens a gaping security hole.
Use "xauth" or "ssh -X root@localhost". If you generate ssh keys you can even log into root *without* password. This is *secure* (!) as long as you keep your privat ssh key secure.
Though I don't recommend this, it is much better than using "xhost".





Member since:
You're right, perhaps to paranoid
xhost also allows connection from a specific host, I think this would be better: xhost +`cat /etc/HOSTNAME`