Linked by Thom Holwerda on Thu 28th Mar 2013 00:36 UTC, submitted by MOS6510
Internet & Networking "The New York Times this morning published a story about the Spamhaus DDoS attack and how CloudFlare helped mitigate it and keep the site online. The Times calls the attack the largest known DDoS attack ever on the Internet. We wrote about the attack last week. At the time, it was a large attack, sending 85Gbps of traffic. Since then, the attack got much worse. Here are some of the technical details of what we've seen."
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RE[3]: Comment by marcp
by Alfman on Fri 29th Mar 2013 03:53 UTC in reply to "RE[2]: Comment by marcp"
Alfman
Member since:
2011-01-28

Soulbender,

"Sure, but there's no way to be anonymous when you do this. As soon as other providers figured who was doing the blackhole routing your little take-over-the-internet plan is toast and trust me, it would not take them long to find you."

I'd like you to give this deeper thought, more like a hacker. For example, a malicious country could advertise routes that are cheaper than they truly are to get foreign routers to route traffic to them. Once they get the packets, they may be able to complete the circuit to the legitimate destination, but now they have not only the ability to snoop packets, but also to filter them using much more discriminate deep packet filtering and even perform targeted injections. It would be very hard for any single organization to prove BGP routes are being manipulated for nefarious purposes.


"Only if by "trust* you mean contracts. You can't just establish a BGP peering with anyone, it requires you to establish a business relationship with those you peer with and unless you're a "Tier 1" player your peers will only accept the prefixes you've been assigned."

Well, consider real world scenarios where A-B are friends and B-C are friends but A-C are enemies. A can abuse the internet's trust relationship to harm C and visa versa.

Edit: I'm just theorizing here, but if anyone knows of cases where this has actually happened, please jump in! I think subtle BGP manipulations could be achieved without detection, but large changes would give rise to latency and routing bottlenecks such that someone would have to investigate the cause.

Edited 2013-03-29 04:02 UTC

Reply Parent Score: 2

RE[4]: Comment by marcp
by Soulbender on Fri 29th Mar 2013 04:16 in reply to "RE[3]: Comment by marcp"
Soulbender Member since:
2005-08-18

For example, a malicious country could advertise routes that are cheaper than they truly are to get foreign routers to route traffic to them.


This would be incredibly difficult to orchestrate (for a number of technical and practical reasons) but lets say someone did. This is why we have end-to-end encryption.

It would be very hard for any single organization to prove BGP routes are being manipulated for nefarious purposes.


Other than by the massive amount of suddenly appearing transit traffic to and from the country?

Well, consider real world scenarios where A-B are friends and B-C are friends but A-C are enemies. A can abuse the internet's trust relationship to harm C and visa versa.


A and B are peers, B and C are peers but A and C are not. A could only announce C's prefixes (and vice versa) if B is in on it and if that's the case,well, you have bigger problems than BGP and then it's not something that can be solved technically.

Reply Parent Score: 2