Linked by Thom Holwerda on Fri 23rd Sep 2011 22:22 UTC, submitted by kragil
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Also, you're contradicting yourself: either the tech is sufficient to create a walled garden (ie. it's secure), or it's not. If it's not secure, then people can get past the signing mechanisms in exactly the same way that you propose that malware could.
OK.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
How could I possibly make my point clearer?
- Gilboa
OK.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
For the 15'th time, I not claiming that it's impossible to secure the boot environment - I am saying that securing the boot environment has zero, 0, NULL effect on the security of the system as it cannot prevent a *OS* or *USER* level vulnerability (or plain stupidity) from compromising the OS and/or the user file.
You started out saying:
OK, you do realize that once the OS is compromised, nothing stops the malware from deactivating the signature check mechanism and installing a key logger as a signed update or even throw in a modified kernel image while they are at it, right?
Which is what I addressed. How could I possibly make my point clearer?
Perhaps by not changing your 'point' once it proves fallacious? I've been perfectly civil and patient with you throughout this exchange, so I feel justified when I say don't be a douchebag.





Member since:
2010-06-19
Look, you seem to be under at least a couple of misapprehensions.
- The firmware will only boot code that has been signed using the right keys.
- The private signing keys have (theoretically) not been compromised.
- Unless the malware has those keys, there is simply no way for the malware to write anything to the boot sector that UEFI will boot.
- The malware also cannot write over UEFI, itself (theoretically).
There is merit to the security argument. Of course, to even get to the security argument, you have to grant that Windows is going to be compromised and that a substantial amount of malware is going to target the boot sector.
Also, you're contradicting yourself: either the tech is sufficient to create a walled garden (ie. it's secure), or it's not. If it's not secure, then people can get past the signing mechanisms in exactly the same way that you propose that malware could.
Edited 2011-09-25 09:07 UTC